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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act) to help lower the cost of
drugs for the public and to encourage investment in research and
development of new drugs.1 The Hatch-Waxman Act was a compromise
that aimed to fulfill two goals: to extend patents for name-brand (pioneer)
drug companies and to ease FDA approval for generic drug companies to
enter the market.2 Decades later, commentators praise the Hatch-Waxman
Act for creating the generic pharmaceutical industry.3
Although the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to increase
competition between pioneer and generic drug companies, pioneer drug
1. See Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The
Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417,
421 (2011) (predicting generic drugs would save American consumers $920 million).
2. See id. (explaining that there were 150 pioneer drugs in the market with no
generic versions).
3. See Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by
Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS
L.J. 171, 175-76 (2008) (detailing that the Act also ensured the quality of generic drugs
and eliminated research costs for duplicate clinical trials).
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companies began making settlements with generic drug companies called
“reverse payment” agreements that effectively delay competition.4 Reverse
payment agreements allowed the pioneer drug company to retain its
monopoly on the market by delaying generic drug entry, and thus made the
Hatch-Waxman Act ineffective in bringing competition to that particular
drug market.5
Under the Sherman Act, the antitrust analysis for patent antitrust claims
is complex because the purpose of patent law—to grant a legal
monopoly—contradicts the purpose of antitrust law—to prevent a
monopoly.6 To balance both laws, courts use the rule of reason analysis in
patent antitrust claims to determine whether a practice or agreement that
exploits the patent is an unreasonable restraint on trade.7
Courts were split on whether reverse payment agreements under the
Hatch-Waxman Act violated the Sherman Antitrust Act and applied three
different analyses to determine whether a violation had occurred.8 Some
courts followed the precedent of most Sherman Antitrust patent cases and
used the general antitrust analysis of rule of reason to determine whether
reverse payment agreements were an unreasonable restraint to trade.9
Other courts held reverse payment agreements as per se illegal agreements
and banned them all together.10 Lastly, some courts moved away from both
the rule of reason analysis and the per se illegal designation and instead
applied a scope of the patent analysis, which permits the patent holder to
maintain a monopoly on an invalid or expired patent.11
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court was correct in holding that
4. See id. at 181 (describing the settlement between a pioneer and generic drug
company that result in the generic delaying marketing of its generic equivalent until a
later date).
5. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 432 (describing pioneer drug companies as
“gaming” the Hatch-Waxman Act to their advantage and delaying generic drug
competition).
6. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 216 (3d Cir. 2012) (recognizing
that the court must proceed with caution because the patent holder possesses a legal
monopoly).
7. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1982)
(explaining that the rule of reason requires a holistic approach that weighs all the
circumstances surrounding the industry).
8. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209, 210-14, 217 (describing the varying
precedent from five other circuits, and applying a form of rule of reason analysis).
9. See Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. at 343 (explaining the rule of reason
is the predominantly used analysis for antitrust cases).
10. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 210-11 (surmising per se illegal designation
broadly dismisses reverse payment agreements).
11. See id. at 212-13 (describing the Second Circuit’s denial of an antitrust claim
over a reverse payment agreement that occurred after the patent was found invalid).
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the rule of reason analysis is the best analysis for reverse payment
agreements because the scope of the patent and per se illegal analyses do
not provide a balance between patent and antitrust interests.12 Part II
examines the process of FDA drug approval and the two antitrust analyses
that are applied to antitrust claims.13 Part II also discusses the varying
antitrust analyses that courts have applied to reverse payment agreements
and the most recent case of In re K-Dur.14 Part III argues that the Supreme
Court was correct to adopt the rule of reason analysis for reverse payment
antitrust claims because the rule of reason provides the best inquiry that
incorporates both patent and antitrust law.15 Part III also reviews the faults
of applying the per se illegal and the scope of the patent analyses and
argues that these tests do not provide the proper balance between patent
and antitrust laws.16 Part IV offers policy arguments against reverse
payment agreements.17 Finally, Part V of this Comment concludes that by
applying the rule of reason, courts will be able to consistently apply
antitrust laws to reverse payment antitrust litigation.18
II. BACKGROUND
A. How the Hatch-Waxman Act Opened the Market to Generic Drug
Manufacturers
The new drug approval process is a long and costly venture, requiring
the applicant to submit a New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA that is
12. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013) (holding the rule of
reason applied to reverse payment agreements). The Supreme Court’s decision in
Actavis was handed down as this Comment was going to press. Though the Court’s
decision in regards to the application of the rule of reason is instructive when applied to
reverse payment agreement cases like In re K-Dur, the analysis presented here will
more thoroughly explore the various analyses performed by the lower courts and is still
relevant to show why applying the rule of reason follows legal precedent for patent
antitrust cases. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (concluding the scope of the patent
analysis does not apply any antitrust scrutiny because the scope of the patent analysis
solely focuses on the rights of the patent holder).
13. See infra Part II (outlining the FDA drug approval process).
14. See infra Part II (describing circuit precedent).
15. See infra Part III (arguing the rule of reason is a neutral analysis between the
scope of the patent and per se illegal analyses).
16. See infra Part III (arguing the scope of the patent test is an insufficient antitrust
analysis).
17. See infra Part IV (illustrating how patent drug infringement cases that settle as
a result of reverse payment agreements are allowing monopolies on patents that should
have been made invalid, and thus hindering competition).
18. See infra Part V (concluding the rule of reason provides a necessary balance
between patent law and antitrust law).
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comprised of preclinical and clinical data to demonstrate the safety and
effectiveness of the drug for human consumption.19 Prior to the HatchWaxman Act, if a generic brand was similar in effectiveness to a new drug,
the FDA still required the generic manufacturer to spend millions of dollars
conducting its own research and collecting data for a separate full NDA.20
The Hatch-Waxman Act opened the door to generic drug manufacturers
by shortening the process and reducing FDA approval costs.21 The full
NDA requirement was changed to an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA) that allowed a bioequivalent generic drug to gain approval merely
by demonstrating the generic drug was as safe and effective as the original
drug.22 In addition to filing the ANDA, the applicant must certify the
application under a paragraph IV, which declares that the new drug does
not infringe any patent listed with the FDA.23 When a generic
manufacturer submits a paragraph IV certification, it must send notice to
each listed patent owner impacted.24 Upon filing the ANDA and the
certification, the patent holder has forty-five days to initiate an
infringement suit against the applicant.25
Upon the filing of an
infringement suit, an automatic stay will prevent the FDA from approving
the generic drug until the earlier of thirty months or a court hearing that
finds the patent has not been infringed or is invalid.26 At the dismissal of
the automatic stay and upon the approval by the FDA, the generic brand
receives a 180-day exclusivity period where it is the only generic
manufacturer that can market the product.27 Only the first generic
19. See Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 801 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (declaring “[a]n NDA is time consuming and costly to prepare”); see also Kelly,
supra note 1, at 420 (describing the paperwork for an NDA and describing that generic
drug applicants do not have to apply for similar drug approval).
20. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 420-22 (explaining the cost of clinical trials was a
major hindrance to generic manufacturers).
21. See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as
a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1565 (2006) (reporting the cost
for an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) reduced the cost of FDA approval
from over two hundred million dollars to one million dollars).
22. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 420-21 (explaining the retesting of the generic drug
was also found unethical because it required that some patients receive placebos and
not effective treatment).
23. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012) (“[Su]ch patent is invalid or will
not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the
application is submitted[.]”).
24. See id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iii)(I) (requiring notice to each patent owner that is
subject to the certification).
25. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
26. See id.
27. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
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manufacturer who submits a paragraph IV certification receives the
exclusivity period, and they may use it at their sole discretion.28
Theoretically, the Hatch-Waxman Act would allow generic
manufacturers to spend fewer resources to enter the market.29 However, in
actuality, pioneer manufacturers were taking advantage of the HatchWaxman Act to delay product release through agreements made between
them and generic manufacturers.30 A generic manufacturer that filed an
ANDA would eventually settle the patent infringement suit with the
pioneer manufacturer and agree to not market its product in return for
payment.31
These settlements became known as reverse payment
agreements.32 The agreements often required that the generic manufacturer
maintain its 180-day exclusion right to bar the FDA from approving other
generic drugs of the same bioequivalence.33 This allowed the pioneer drug
company to maintain a de facto monopoly on the market beyond the patent
expiration.34 Reverse payment agreements eventually caught the attention
of Congress, prompting it to change the statute to require that drug
companies file the settlement agreements for review of possible antitrust
issues.35
B. Standard Antitrust Scrutiny
Antitrust law stems from the Sherman Act that forbids any contract or
agreement that restrains trade or commerce in the United States.36 The
28. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb) (describing the first applicant as the first one
who submits an application containing a certification under paragraph (2)(A)(vii)(IV)).
29. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 421 (articulating the generic manufacturer could
now challenge the validity of a drug patent at a reduced cost).
30. See Legislative and Regulatory Responses to the FTC Study on Barriers to
Entry in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong. 4-5 (2003) [hereinafter Judiciary] (statement of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman,
Federal Trade Commission) (arguing that reverse payment agreements were delaying
generic drug entry into the market).
31. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 431 (describing the general practice uses reverse
payments to delay generic drug entry into the market).
32. See id. (providing, as an alternative name, “pay-for-delay”).
33. See id. (noting that generic companies agreed not to challenge the patent or
market the generic in exchange for payments).
34. See id. (arguing that asserting its 180-day exclusion rights near the expiration
of the patent allowed the pioneer company to block entry of other generic companies
for at most 180 days).
35. See id. at 437 (explaining the 2003 Amendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act
required the parties to file copies of the settlement agreement with the FTC and
Department of Justice).
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2010) (declaring, in plain language, every contract that
restrains trade or commerce amongst the states is illegal); see also State Oil Co. v.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol21/iss4/6

6

Ford: Using Reverse Payment Agreements as an Effective Way to Maintain

2013]

USING REVERSE PAYMENT AGREEMENTS

925

statute is interpreted to outlaw only unreasonable restraints using a rule of
reason analysis for most antitrust claims.37 Under the rule of reason
analysis, the court weighs a variety of factors, including specific
information about the relevant business, the condition of the business
before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history,
nature, and effect, to determine whether the questioned practice is an
unreasonable restraint on trade.38
Restraint of trade can be deemed unlawful per se if the court can predict
the harmful anticompetitive effect of the restraint and identify only limited
pro-competitive benefits.39 Per se antitrust is applicable when the court is
reasonably able to predict that the practice will restrict competition and
decrease output.40 The Supreme Court has categorized practices such as
horizontal price-fixing as illegal per se because the probability of the
anticompetitive nature of the practice is high.41
C. Hatch-Waxman Antitrust Analysis
Prior to In re K-Dur in the Third Circuit, sister circuits reviewed antitrust
claims against reverse payment agreements and applied varying antitrust
analyses, including a newly defined scope of the patent analysis that was
created just for patents under the Hatch-Waxman Act.42 The various
antitrust analyses resulted in differing outcomes on the same or similar
facts.43
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (establishing the Sherman Act as the antitrust standard).
37. See Khan, 522 U.S. at 10 (explaining precedent only applies rule of reason and
per se illegal analyses).
38. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
39. See Kahn, 522 U.S. at 10 (stating that “predictable and pernicious
anticompetitive” restraints are per se illegal).
40. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1982)
(asserting a per se illegal analysis permits courts to confidently predict that the rule of
reason will condemn the restraint of trade); see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (concluding the blanket license did not
facially appear to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output).
41. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984) (defining horizontal
price-fixing as an agreement between competitors that sets a nonnegotiable price on a
good).
42. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 210, 218 (3d Cir. 2012)
(holding that the rule of reason applied); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d
896, 907 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding per se illegal analysis applied); Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharm., 344 F.3d 1294, 1310 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939
(2004) (applying the scope of the patent analysis to reverse payment agreements).
43. Compare In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 211-12 (citing Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at
1294) (using the rule of reason to find the reverse payment agreement between
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1. Rule of Reason Analysis
In antitrust cases, courts typically apply the rule of reason analysis,
which is more deferential than the per se illegal analysis.44 Under the rule
of reason, the court will look at factors such as the industry and its
condition prior to and after the restraint; the nature, history, and effect of
the restraint; and the purpose of the restraint intended by the actor.45
Courts will weigh the pro-competitive effects against the anticompetitive
effects to determine whether the restraint is unreasonable.46
In the context of a patent, the purpose of a restraint agreement becomes
more influential to the fact finder because patents already provide a right to
exclude, and the court will not interfere with that right.47 The agreement
and the actions of the parties to the agreement are factors to determine the
actual purpose or intent of the settlement.48 Any acts by the parties that
hinder competition upon signing the settlement can disprove any original
intent posed during the negotiations.49
2. Per Se Illegal Analysis
Certain agreements are categorized as per se illegal because their effect
on competition is so harmful and without any valued benefit that they
automatically violate the Sherman Act.50 The per se illegal analysis comes

Schering and generic brands did violate the Sherman Act), with Schering-Plough Corp.
v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that under the scope of the
patent analysis, the reverse payment agreement between Schering and generic brand
drugs did not violate the Sherman Act).
44. See Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. at 344 (explaining the per se illegal
rule may invalidate some agreements that would be upheld under the rule of reason
analysis).
45. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (asserting
the legality of an agreement is not a simple determination but requires the consideration
of many factors).
46. See In re-K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209 (providing that if the plaintiff can show the
challenged conduct has anti-competitive effects on the market, then the burden to prove
a sufficiently procompetitive objective shifts to the defendant).
47. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 189-90 (1963) (insisting
the purpose of the agreement between patent holders to exclude was within the purview
of the Sherman Act).
48. See id. at 190-93 (holding the parties actions clearly established a concerted
action to restrain trade).
49. See id. at 195 (questioning defendant’s procompetitive objective to end
litigation because defendant sued competitors on behalf of joint parties’ patent’s).
50. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (explaining
that agreements that have a harmful effect on competition and lack any redeeming
virtue are unreasonable).
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under the Sherman Act as applied by the courts.51 The following are
categorized as per se illegal: price-fixing (horizontal agreements), division
of markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements.52
Reverse payment agreements closely resemble price-fixing in a
horizontal agreement.53 A horizontal agreement is an agreement between
direct competitors to allocate shares of the market to minimize
competition.54 Horizontal agreements usually take the form of direct
competitors agreeing to set a minimum price (price-fixing) for a product in
order to eliminate competition.55
If the practice is not clearly price-fixing, the court reviews factors to
show that the practice is typically harmful to the market.56 Especially in
cases where the law allows a monopoly, the court must look at whether
experience warrants classifying the type of agreement as per se illegal.57
The court considers the special conditions surrounding the industry and
determines whether the agreement or practice has some redeeming value in
the context of the industry.58 The court’s analysis should account for
Congress’s perspective of the practice and whether adjustments to the law
were created to prevent the practice.59 When a statute provides a
monopolistic industry around certain rights, the court cannot deem
agreements that reasonably enforce those rights as per se illegal.60
Lastly, to determine whether the agreement requires per se distinction,
51. See id.
52. See id. (finding the negative consequences of these broad activities outweighed
any positive benefits that may arise).
53. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 2003)
(concluding an agreement where the pioneer drug company paid the generic drug
company to delay market entry was a horizontal agreement).
54. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (explaining a
vertical agreement occurs when the competitors are not direct competitors or are on
different levels of the market).
55. See id. at 611-12 (explaining that restraining competition by a private party is
biased by the party’s own interests, while the same restraint made by Congress
evaluates the competing interests to come to a resolution that benefits society).
56. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979)
(finding that two partners agreeing to a price does not always violate the Sherman Act).
57. See id. (explaining how conditions in copyright law are sui generis; thus
recognizing there are particular laws created for the purpose of protecting licensing).
58. See id. at 14-15 (explaining that in “unique” markets the circumstances can
negate a per se finding because the restraint on trade increases competition or makes it
more efficient).
59. See id. at 15-16 (explaining that Congress created a similar copyright licensing
fee scheme as the plaintiff in question indicating the scheme was pro-competitive).
60. See id. at 19 (explaining that copyright laws provide the owner with power to
restrict use of the copyrighted material and the court must be sensitive to this fact).
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the court must evaluate whether the practice facially appears to usually
restrict the market and oppress market output, and whether no alternatives
are available in the market.61 If the agreement increases efficiency and
market output, and there are alternative products or services in the market,
the court will not use a per se illegal analysis.62
Once a practice is held as per se illegal, the analysis requires that the
practice is automatically deemed illegal.63 The court will not do any
further review and any benefits from the practice are lost.64 Because the
per se illegal analysis is so harsh, courts are reluctant to find a per se illegal
restraint and apply a per se illegal analysis.65
3. Scope of the Patent Analysis
The scope of the patent analysis is a new analysis created by the
Eleventh Circuit that was developed because of the complexities between
the legal monopolies granted by patent law and the Hatch-Waxman Act.66
The analysis is primarily founded under patent law and is overwhelmingly
in favor of the patent holder.67 Under the scope of the patent analysis,
courts have held that the pioneer manufacturer’s patent gives it
exclusionary rights, and the reverse payment agreement is valid if it is
within those rights.68 In one case where the Eleventh Circuit applied the
scope of the patent analysis, the court gave directions to review the case in
light of whether the provisions in the agreement exceeded the scope of the
exclusionary rights of the patent, and upon review, determine if the acts

61. See id. at 19-20, 23-24 (concluding the licensing was reasonable because there
were alternative licensing fees).
62. See id. at 20 (finding the license agreement was beneficial to the copyright
market because it helped efficiency, and the plaintiff had alternatives that were not
adequately sought).
63. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982)
(describing the per se distinction as a rule of “general application”).
64. See id. (acknowledging that the per se illegal analysis is imperfect because it
invalidates practices that the rule of reason might uphold).
65. See id. (requiring previous court experience with the practice so that the court
can confidently assume the rule of reason will find it illegal).
66. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003)
(holding the agreement did not violate the Sherman Act because the exclusionary effect
was within the patent expiration date).
67. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining
the scope of the patent analysis does not use any antitrust scrutiny and no reverse
payment case has ever gone to trial).
68. See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1306-07 (concluding that reverse payment
agreements were not per se illegal when the agreement was no broader than the patent’s
exclusionary right).
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were anticompetitive.69
The scope of the patent analysis favors patent law over antitrust law
because it evaluates the patent monopoly as a stand-alone analysis.70 It
rejects further inquiry into the surrounding factors of the industry and
precludes antitrust analysis that is generally required in patent antitrust
claims.71 The scope of the patent analysis results in the court merely basing
an antitrust claim on patent law.72 The only occasion the court found an
antitrust violation under a scope of the patent analysis for a reverse
payment agreement was in Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Elan Corp.73 In
Elan Corp., the settlement agreement excluded the generic drug from the
market beyond the patent expiration date.74 The court found an antitrust
claim in the agreement because the generic manufacturer agreed to never
market the generic drug, thus giving the patent holder an unlimited patent
monopoly.75
D. Returning to the Rule of Reason: In re K-Dur
1. Facts
The facts of this case arise from an agreement between a pioneer drug
manufacturer, Schering, and generic manufacturers, Upshur and ESI.76
Schering created K-Dur and obtained a patent on the controlled-release
coating of a potassium chloride supplement that is used to treat potassium
deficiencies.77 In 1995, on separate occasions, two generic manufacturers
each filed ANDAs that certified their generic drug based on a paragraph IV

69. See id. at 1312 (stating the prohibition of generic brands, the waiver of the 180day exclusivity period, and other provisions require consideration under the scope of
the patent).
70. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (asserting the scope of the patent analysis
improperly restricts antitrust law to instances of fraud on the Patent and Trademark
Office or baseless infringement claims).
71. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196-97 (1963) (concluding
antitrust law still applies to patent holders).
72. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (noting the scope of the patent analysis is not
an antitrust analysis).
73. See 421 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that blocking the generic
after the patent expired was beyond the scope of the patent exclusion).
74. See id. (narrowing the relevant market to controlled release naproxen).
75. See id. (explaining the agreement eliminated the competition because the
defendant was the only supplier).
76. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205-06 (explaining Upsher was the first generic
manufacturer to file a paragraph IV certification and ESI filed months later).
77. See id. at 203 (noting the patent expired in September 2006).
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non-infringement claim.78 The first, Upsher, created a generic version of
K-Dur, and upon defending the patent infringement claim, argued the
composition of the controlled release coating in its generic version was
different than Schering’s.79 The litigation ended by settlement, hours
before the district court would rule on motions for summary judgment.80 In
the settlement, Upsher did not concede to the validity or the possible
infringement of the patent, but agreed to delay marketing of its generic
drug until September 1, 2001.81 Interestingly, Upsher also gave a license to
Schering to make and sell other drugs in exchange for payments of over
sixty million dollars over three years.82
The second agreement between Schering was with another generic drug
company, ESI, who defended the infringement suit based on their
controlled release version being a multi-layered coating.83 The patent
infringement litigation ended when ESI agreed to delay marketing until
2004 in exchange for an initial payment of five million dollars and future
payments contingent upon approval of ESI’s ANDA.84
Various wholesalers and retailers who purchased K-Dur brought antitrust
claims.85 The district court held that the settlements were only subject to
antitrust scrutiny if the scope of Schering’s patent was exceeded or the
underlying patent infringement suits were objectively baseless.86
2. Opinion
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed.87 The court rejected the scope of

78. See id. at 205-06 (stating that both generic companies asserted their drugs fell
outside of the patent because they used different chemical compositions).
79. See id. at 205 (describing Upsher’s characterization of the suit as “baseless”).
80. See id. (acknowledging the settlement was prior to a patent trial, but after some
litigation).
81. See id. (explaining Upsher would receive a non-royalty non-exclusive license
to sell and make its generic drug at the conclusion of the agreement).
82. See id. at 205-06 (assuming the secondary purpose of the settlement was later
asserted as primary reason for payment).
83. See id. at 206 (contrasting ESI’s multi-layered coating with the patent-holder’s
single layered coating).
84. See id. (explaining ESI agreed to a royalty-free license to begin in 2004 and a
contingent payment that ranged from six-hundred and twenty-five to ten million dollars
for ANDA approval).
85. See id. at 207 (finding that purchasers who were harmed by the effect of the
agreement can bring suit).
86. See id. at 208 (describing the special master’s presumption that Schering’s
patent was valid and it therefore had a right to exclude or agree to settlements until the
patent expired).
87. See id. at 218 (rebuking the district court’s use of the scope of the patent
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the patent analysis and held that the rule of reason should apply for reverse
payment settlements.88 In rejecting the scope of the patent analysis, the
court argued that the analysis did not apply any antitrust scrutiny under the
Sherman Act and was not within the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act.89
Although patent law gave Schering the right to exclude others and license
its K-Dur patent, the court found it improper to legally assume the
underlying patent was valid when determining if the exclusionary rights of
the patent extended to the settlement.90
Patent validity was the core of the scope of the patent analysis, but the
FTC’s findings challenged that assertion when the Commission reported
Hatch-Waxman patent infringement suits have a seventy-three percent
success rate.91 The court concluded that a generic drug certification under
paragraph IV of the Hatch-Waxman Act was likely to overturn a weak
patent and open the market to competitors.92
Using the rule of reason, the court found a payment to a generic
company prima facie evidence of a restraint to trade.93 The large payment
was given consideration for the delay and not to license other drugs as the
settling parties had argued.94 Upsher and ESI would not have delayed
entering the market but for Schering paying them millions of dollars in
compensation for the profit lost by not marketing their generic products.95
Schering, Upsher, and ESI could rebut the evidence if they could show that
the payment was not for delayed entry or that there was a benefit that
encouraged competition.96 Under this analysis, the court of appeals
analysis).
88. See id. (adopting the quick look rule of reason in light of the “economic
realities” in the industry).
89. See id. at 214 (dismissing the scope of the patent as contrary to a “long line of
Supreme Court precedent on patent litigation and competition”).
90. See id. (asserting that courts only assume patent validity in a procedural manner
and not as a substantive right that is conclusive in the law).
91. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 16 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/
genericdrugstudy.pdf (reporting study findings from 1992 – 2002).
92. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (arguing that the exclusionary right of the
patent is less justified when a possible competitor, who can challenge the patent and
possibly win, is paid off).
93. See id. at 218 (viewing the generic deferral date as an unreasonable litigation
compromise).
94. See id. at 218 (concluding that the quid pro quo for the payment was the
generic’s agreement to delay marketing).
95. See id. at 205-06 (observing that Upsher received sixty million dollars to delay,
and ESI received between six-hundred and twenty-five thousand and ten million dollars
depending on FDA approval).
96. See id. at 218 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the payments were for
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remanded the case to the district court with instructions for the defendant to
provide pro-competitive justifications for the reverse payment
settlements.97
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court was correct in holding that the rule of reason
analysis is the best analysis for reverse payment agreements.98 The rule of
reason should apply because patent law requires a more balanced review of
patent and antitrust than the inquiry provided in the per se illegal or scope
of the patent analyses.99 On one end of the spectrum, a per se illegal
analysis would completely negate reverse payment agreements regardless
of their benefits to patent law.100 On the other end, the scope of the patent
analysis is one of many factors used in general antitrust analysis and fails to
review the concerted actions between patent holders.101 The rule of reason
analysis does what the other two fail to do: allows a full antitrust analysis
of reverse payment agreements based on the market effect of the parties’
joint agreements.102 Applying the rule of reason, the Court should hold the
reverse payment agreement in In re K-Dur as an unreasonable restraint to
trade and a violation of the Sherman Act because it intentionally eliminates
competition.103

licensing other drugs because the licensed drugs were subsequently abandoned).
97. See id. at 209, 218 (finding the plaintiff met its burden, and the burden shifted
to the defendant to rebut the evidence).
98. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (holding the rule of
reason weighs the anticompetitive and pro-competitive effects of reverse payment
agreements).
99. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (explaining that patents provide a valid
monopoly, and the court must evaluate the agreement based on the generic
pharmaceutical industry).
100. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 16 (1979)
(explaining there was no universal consensus that blanket licensing was per se illegal as
price-fixing so the facts required a rule of reason analysis to assess the claim).
101. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918)
(establishing the scope of monopoly as one factor).
102. See Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 9-10 (clarifying per se designation
concludes inquiry while the rule of reason provides the proper background review that
legal monopolies require); In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (concluding the scope of the
patent does not allow any antitrust analysis).
103. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196 (1963) (establishing
the main objective of an agreement cannot be to enforce broad market exclusion).
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A. The General Antitrust Analysis of Rule of Reason Is the Best Analysis to
Apply to Reverse Payment Agreements Because It Properly Balances the
Rights of the Patent Holder with Adequate Antitrust Scrutiny.
The purpose of antitrust analysis in a patent claim is to ensure that the
patent is not used in transactions between competitors to eliminate
competition.104 The patent antitrust claim in In re K-Dur requires inquiry
into the pharmaceutical industry because the actions of Schering, Upsher,
and ESI must be evaluated for their pro-competitive and anticompetitive
effects on the market.105 The rule of reason is the best analysis to evaluate
the generic drug market because it incorporates many factors that
holistically provide a reasonable conclusion about the pro-competitive and
anticompetitive effects of reverse payment agreements.106 Under the rule
of reason, the reverse payment agreement in In re K-Dur creates an
anticompetitive effect of eliminating competition while providing minimal
pro-competitive benefits such as resolving patent infringement suits,
thereby violating the Sherman Act.107
1. The Rule of Reason is the Best Option Because It Balances Antitrust Law
with Patent Law.
The rule of reason is applicable for reverse payment agreements because
complexities of the pharmaceutical market require the court’s full inquiry
in its antitrust analysis.108 The settlement parties have legal rights that the
court must uphold under patent law and the Hatch-Waxman Act while
ensuring competition is not hindered in the market.109 On the side most
favorable to purchasers of drugs, the per se illegal analysis completely bars
reverse payment agreements regardless of their positive effects.110 On the
side most favorable to drug manufacturers, the scope of the patent analysis
104. See id. at 190 (applying the rule of reason when the court evaluated the sewing
machine market and the course of dealings to conclude the patent license was an
unreasonable restraint).
105. See id. (focusing on the competitors’ agreement to pool their patents and
enforce each others’ in a concerted effort to restrain trade).
106. See id. (evaluating the number of competitors and the market share before and
after the agreement).
107. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (asserting there were few pro-competitive
reasons for a reverse payment agreement).
108. See id. at 208 (explaining reverse payment agreements are only found in
settlements under the Hatch-Waxman Act).
109. See id. at 217-18 (articulating the balance between innovation and public
interest that courts must evaluate).
110. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982)
(explaining that per se illegal distinctions are applied in general application for business
certainty).
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neglects the effect on the market.111 In order to provide proper antitrust
patent scrutiny, all factors must be reviewed to balance all of the parties’
interests.112
The rule of reason analysis is better than the scope of the patent analysis
because the rule of reason does not favor patent law over antitrust, but
creates a balance between the laws.113 Specifically, the rule of reason
incorporates the scope of the patent in question as one factor that should be
considered together with other factors.114 The court must be allowed to
look beyond the scope of the patent to evaluate whether the reverse
payment agreements harm the generic drug industry or help make it more
efficient.115 Patent law is best balanced with antitrust law because while a
patent holder may exclude competitors, it may not pool its resources or
competitors to completely eliminate competitors from the market.116
In addition, the rule of reason is better than a per se designation because
there is no consensus in the pharmaceutical industry that the
anticompetitive effects of reverse payment agreements on the market
outweigh the pro-competitive effects.117 The rule of reason will uphold
reverse payment agreements that work as a benefit to the market, while
rejecting those that are anticompetitive.118 This is a more balanced option
than per se designation, which completely bars all reverse payment
agreements.119 Because Congress and others have reviewed reverse
payment agreements and have not found them to be anticompetitive, the
111. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir.
2003) (restricting the district court’s antitrust analysis to exclusions that are beyond the
patent’s exclusionary effect).
112. See Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. at 343 (articulating that the rule of
reason requires the fact finder to evaluate all of the circumstances regarding a practice).
113. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (arguing that rule of reason analysis strongly
supports the line Congress drew between patent law and antitrust law).
114. See Bd. of Trade of Chi.v. United States,, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (including
the relevant business, the effect, and the nature of the restraint in the court’s rule of
reason analysis).
115. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979)
(maintaining that the license agreement receives more deference under the rule of
reason because the rule of reason balanced copyright law with antitrust law).
116. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 197 (1963) (explaining
there are strict limits on concerted actions between patent holders to control the
market).
117. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 16 (observing a lack of universal view that
blanket licensing was price-fixing).
118. See id. at 15 (explaining that per se designation does not provide any flexibility
in inquiry).
119. See id. at 11 (concluding the practice should not be outlawed as a per se
restraint regardless of the intensive antitrust scrutiny shown to the practice).
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court must refrain from applying per se designations and instead use the
rule of reason.120
2. Under the Rule of Reason, the Reverse Payment Agreement in In re KDur Is a Violation of the Sherman Act Because It Supports More
Anticompetitive than Pro-competitive Effects on the Market.
Under the full rule of reason, the reverse payment agreement in In re KDur is a violation of the Sherman Act because Schering intended to
eliminate market competition.121 To determine whether the questioned
practice is an unreasonable restraint of trade, various factors must be
evaluated, including the relevant market, the scope of the patent, the
parties’ intentions, and the practical effect the practice has on the market.122
The relevant market is the generic controlled release potassium chloride
market used for potassium deficiencies because the patent in question was
the main consideration for the reverse payment agreement.123 Under the
context of the generic pharmaceutical industry, there are incentives for the
pioneer drug company to maintain its monopoly and for the generic drug
companies to delay entering the market.124 The reverse payment agreement
allowed Schering to maintain its monopoly on controlled release formulas
and for Upsher and ESI to receive compensation for the profits they
forfeited by delaying the market entry of their controlled release
formulas.125

120. See id. at 24 (concluding the background of the practice required further
inquiry than per se designation would allow).
121. See Singer, 374 U.S. at 196 (concluding the parties’ intention to eliminate the
market is based on what they did rather than the labels applied); In re K-Dur Antitrust
Litigation, 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding that the intent for the reverse
payment was to delay generic market entry to maintain a monopoly).
122. See Bd. of Trade, of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239-40 (1918)
(observing the scope of the rule in question along with the effect and nature of the
rule).
123. Compare In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205 (rejecting the argument that the sixty
million dollar payment to Upsher was for the drug Niacor, and thus narrowed the
market to controlled release potassium chloride tablets), with Schering-Plough Corp. v.
FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1070-71 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding the sixty million dollar
payment to Upsher was indeed a royalty for Niacor, and thus precluded the generic
drug from hitting the market).
124. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 208, 218 (explaining a generic manufacturer takes
over ninety percent of the patent holder’s unit sales after the first year of market entry
and concluding a reverse payment is prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint
of trade because a reasonable generic manufacturer would not otherwise delay).
125. See id. at 218 (explaining a common sense application of the facts shows
Schering paid Upsher and ESI to refrain from entering the market, which is an
unreasonable restraint to trade).
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The Court may look at the course of dealings between the parties to
determine the true intent of the parties.126 In the early proceedings, Upsher
and ESI strongly defended their generic drugs as non-infringing and
Upsher testified that the patent infringement claim was made in bad
faith.127 The Court could use this as evidence that Schering was in fear of
losing its patent and therefore created the reverse settlement agreements in
order to keep its patent.128 However, Schering might argue that it simply
wanted to settle to free up money and resources to return to creating
drugs.129 In the case at bar, Schering had more to lose if it lost the patent
infringement case than if it settled because if it lost, Schering would have
to split the profits, which were eight-times the amount paid in the
settlement.130 Thus, its intent was to uphold the patent and its profits
through the reverse payment agreement.131
The Court will also evaluate whether the actions could reasonably
eliminate competition.132 A concerted action to restrain competitors is a
violation of the Sherman Act.133 Schering signed reverse payment
agreements with two of its competitors in the controlled release potassium
chloride market.134
Whether Schering paid off all the competitors is unknown; however, the
reverse payment agreements give Schering illegal control of the generic
market because subsequent generic market entry is cost-prohibitive for
126. See Singer, 374 U.S. at 189-90 (stating the patent holder’s conversations prior
to the agreement were evidence of an illegal intent to eliminate competition).
127. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205 (describing Upsher’s contention that their
coating contained a different composition than the patented drug, and ESI’s argument
that their coating was multilayered and therefore unlike the single layer of the patented
drug).
128. See id. at 205 (explaining the Upsher agreement came just hours before cross
motions for summary judgment).
129
See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003)
(asserting that restricting settlements will increase the cost of patent enforcement and
harm innovation).
130. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 980 (2003), vacated,
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting Schering’s
internal analysis revealed annual sales were $190 million prior to the settlement).
131. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (concluding the reverse payment was quidpro quo for delaying market entry).
132. See Singer, 374 U.S. at 190 (concluding the party’s actions had the potential to
eliminate foreign competitors); Broad. Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441
U.S. 1, 29 (1979) (concluding available alternatives did not eliminate competition).
133. See Singer, 374 U.S. at 195 (concluding the competitors market was reduced by
the illegal agreement).
134. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205-06 (explaining that Upsher filed its ANDA
just months prior to ESI filing its ANDA).
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subsequent paragraph IV filers.135 If a subsequent filer is successful in
invalidating Schering’s patent, there will be four competitors in the market
and less revenue for the generic company who was not a party to the
settlement.136 The decreased revenue reduces the incentive to challenge the
patent because the generic manufacturer will be less likely to recoup its
market entry costs.137 Moreover, if Upsher and ESI have a patent on their
versions of controlled release, the third generic company will have to fight
and win three patent infringement claims before it could share in a
saturated market.138 Patent infringement suits further increase the costs to
enter the market and make the generic pharmaceutical market costBy making generic market entry cost-prohibitive,
prohibitive.139
Schering’s reverse payment agreements eliminate the competition in the
generic market for controlled release potassium chloride tablets and grant
Schering full control of the market.140
3. Pro-competitive Defenses for the Reverse Payment Agreement in In re
K-Dur Provide Minimal Benefits.
Schering, Upsher, and ESI will need to rebut the plaintiff’s claim that the
payments were for market entry delay by providing sufficiently procompetitive reasons for their agreement or a showing that the money was
not for the delay.141 The defendants argued that the payment was a
135. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 384 (1948)
(finding the license agreement illegally eliminated competition by restraining
production of gypsum products, making it difficult for competitors to remain in
business); see also Hemphill, supra note 21, at 1583 (referring to the 180-day exclusion
period as an incentive for the generics to overcome the costs of filing).
136. See In Re Schering-Plough, 136 F.T.C. at 980 (stating Schering’s internal
analysis calculated that total K-Dur revenue would fall to seventy million dollars in
2001); Hemphill, supra note 21, at 1580-1581 (explaining that profits are reduced and
spread out across manufacturers when there are more than two competitors).
137. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (concluding the generic manufacturer receives
the reverse payment to help recoup its cost for manufacturing); Hemphill, supra note
21, at 1581 (explaining that fewer challengers reduces the rate of the patent being
found invalid and increases the incentive to settle and pay for delay).
138. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (arguing that reverse payment agreements
discourage patent challenges which is contrary to the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman
Act); Hemphill, supra note 21, at 1582 (noting there are a limited number of firms
capable of challenging a pioneer company’s patent).
139. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 195 (1963) (concluding the
concerted effort to attack infringers of the combined patents was an unreasonable
restraint of trade).
140. See U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. at 382 (holding the minimum price setting in
the license agreement restricted competition because the market was controlled and not
free).
141. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (finding a reverse payment agreement a prima
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licensing fee for a different drug and is in accordance with their patent law
rights.142 While the agreement appears to work as a licensing agreement to
sell other drugs, a fact finder could logically conclude that the main
purpose of the sixty million dollar payment was to delay generic marketing
of K-Dur.143 The license agreement included one other generic drug,
Niacor, which was subsequently abandoned.144 Therefore, a reasonable
fact finder could conclude that the main purpose of the settlement would
pertain to the K-Dur patent and not to license Niacor.145
The defendants could also argue that their main purpose was to end the
litigation in accordance with public policy.146 This argument is weakened
because the settlement came after costly discovery had already
concluded.147 The court could have found that Upsher did not infringe on
the patent because the generic drug had a different coating than the
patent.148 Further, Upsher and ESI asserted that the chemical composition
of their drugs differed from Schering’s, which would mean a noninfringement of the patent if properly argued.149
The agreed upon delayed market entry dates also provide evidence of
excluding other competitors and giving Schering four more years as a
monopoly.150 The plaintiff could argue that Upsher and ESI would not
facie case of unreasonable restraint without offsetting considerations).
142. See id. at 206 (explaining the major dispute of the parties was the purpose of
the payment).
143. See id. (explaining the drug companies stopped selling the licensed drug after
the settlement was ratified by Schering’s board of directors). But see Schering-Plough
Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the FTC’s expert’s
determination that Niacor was not worth sixty million dollars).
144. See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1070-71 (concluding the main consideration
for the agreement was to obtain a license for Niacor).
145. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205-06 (describing why Schering sued Upsher and
ESI for patent infringement).
146. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2005)
(stating a policy of courts encouraging settlements).
147. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205 (explaining the settlement came prior to the
court ruling on summary judgment).
148. See id. (quoting Upsher calling the infringement claim baseless and not made in
good faith because the products had different compositions).
149. See id. (describing that Upsher’s release coating was a different chemical
composition, and ESI’s drug used a multilayered coating while Schering’s drug had
one layer of coating and a different viscosity). See generally Andrx Pharms., Inc. v.
Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 813 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (assuming a generic competitor
would not reasonably delay marketing its drug).
150. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (stating the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman
Act was for Congress to provide low cost medicine to the consumer); Kelly, supra note
1, at 426 (stating the entry of generic drugs reduces the price of medicine, saving the
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agree to delay market entry if no payment were provided.151 Further, that
the varying amounts were provided to ESI prior to the agreed upon
marketing date, but contingent upon FDA-approval, provides evidence that
the main concern of Schering was to maintain its K-Dur monopoly.152
Therefore, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the purpose of the
agreement was to exclude competition in violation of the Sherman Act.153
B. Per Se Illegal Analysis Is Not the Right Analysis for Reverse Payment
Agreements Because Per Se Designation Will Preemptively Negate All
Reverse Payment Agreements Without Providing Sufficient Inquiry Under
the Sherman Act.
Per se illegal analyses are broad-sweeping and, if applied, will
automatically bar reverse payment agreements in all cases.154 After
reviewing the practice, surrounding industry, congressional response, and
the historical impact, a general understanding of the practice is established
to determine whether all reverse payment agreements are categorically
illegal.155 The per se illegal analysis should not apply to reverse payment
agreements because the balance between patent law and antitrust law
requires more inquiry to properly ascertain the competitive effects.156
1. Arguments Against Applying the Per Se Illegal Analysis
To determine whether per se illegal designation should apply to all
reverse payment agreements and not just the one in In re K-Dur, the pros
and cons of multiple reverse payment agreement cases must be

public eight to ten billion dollars in drug costs in 1994).
151. See Andrx Pharms., 256 F.3d at 813-14 (comparing the actions of the generic
competitor to those of an objectively reasonable competitor).
152. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 206 (ESI’s “licensing” varied from ten million if
the ANDA was approved, to six-hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars if not
approved by the FDA).
153. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196 (1963) (holding the
“common” purpose of suppressing competition was a violation of Sherman Act).
154. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982)
(explaining that per se illegal designation concludes further inquiry under the rule of
reason once a horizontal price-fixing agreement is found and negates the positive
benefits).
155. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 10 (1979)
(asserting that the conditions in copyright and antitrust law must both be evaluated in
the antitrust analysis to account for both).
156. See id. at 20 (holding per se analysis did not apply because the license had procompetitive benefits within copyright law that were sufficient to require a deeper
analysis).
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evaluated.157 Because the antitrust analysis must balance patent interests
with antitrust interests and Congress has implicitly allowed reverse
payment agreements, the per se illegal analysis should not apply.158
i.

The Underlying Patents of Reverse Payment Agreements Must Be
Evaluated Because Patents Provide a Legal Monopoly.

Under the antitrust analysis of the court, the reverse payment agreements
of In re K-Dur are not per se illegal because the agreements are based on a
patent that provides a legal monopoly in the pharmaceutical industry.159
Schering received a patent for K-Dur that gives it the right to exclude
others from using it.160 Until the patent expires or is found invalid,
Schering will continue to have the right of exclusion, and the court will
respect that right.161 However, a per se illegal analysis will preclude further
inquiry about the manner in which Schering used its patent within that
monopoly.162 A per se illegal analysis completely negates patent law
because it only looks at the agreement as it relates to antitrust and fails to
place the agreement in the context of the patent owner’s rights.163 The
Court must balance patent and antitrust law by not applying a per se illegal
analysis but by applying the rule of reason.164
ii.

Reverse Payment Agreements Possess Pro-competitive Benefits.

The Court will also look for pro-competitive benefits for reverse
payment agreements to determine whether they are facial restraints to

157. See id. at 8, 14, 20 (evaluating the entire copyright industry, congressional
review, the pro-competitive benefits, and whether the license was price-fixing to
determine whether the practice generally is anti-competitive).
158. See id. at 15, 20 (concluding the license improved efficiency, was used by
Congress, and there were alternatives in the market).
159. See id. at 19 (arguing that licensing agreements based on copyright laws
provide rights of restriction to the copyright holder that are not per se illegal).
160. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006 & Supp. 2010) (defining infringement as using or
selling any patented material without authorization).
161. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 190 (1963) (explaining
antitrust does not evaluate the patent holders right to exclude, but rather the agreements
to exclude).
162. See id. at 196 (using the rule of reason to analyze the limits of the patent
monopoly).
163. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 216 (3d Cir. 2012) (recognizing
the analysis must be sensitive to the regulated industry of patents).
164. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 390-91 (1948)
(concluding that using patent licensing to control price and output was beyond the
rights of the patent); see also Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 14-16 (finding a practice is not
per se illegal if it benefits the particular industry under the circumstance).
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trade.165 A redeeming quality of reverse payment agreements is their
ability to operate as licensing agreements.166 Typically, a patent holder
issues a license to a possible infringer to grant the infringer access to a
particular market in return for payment.167 Licensing allows Schering to
open the K-Dur patent rights to others for a fee that is then used by
Schering to recoup its initial investment in developing K-Dur.168 Although
Schering delayed granting the license to Upsher and ESI, further inquiry is
needed to determine the harm on the market from this restriction.169 It
would be premature analysis to find reverse payment settlement agreements
that are used as a licensing tool to be per se illegal because it would harm
the purpose of patent law.170
Another redeeming quality of reverse payment settlements is that they
provide efficient resolution of patent infringement litigation, and courts
encourage settlements.171 Patent infringement litigation is expensive, and a
settlement can bring down the cost of enforcement.172 The ScheringUpsher patent infringement litigation in In re K-Dur lasted for two years
before the parties agreed on a settlement.173 A court could reasonably
165. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 23 (explaining that the court looks for a
hindrance to competition in the market as a result of the agreement).
166. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1067-68 (11th Cir. 2005)
(explaining the Schering’s agreement with Upsher was a license under the patent);
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003)
(analogizing reverse payment agreements with licensing).
167. See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1304 (explaining the main purpose of the patent is
to regulate exclusion).
168. See id. at 1304 (explaining the incentive for patents is to induce investment in
innovation).
169. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012) (concluding
a payment in conjunction with a delay was prima facie evidence of an unreasonable
restraint that could be rebutted by evidence showing otherwise).
170. See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1304 (rejecting per se violation of the Sherman
Act because the patent gave a legal monopoly).
171. See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1072-73 (arguing public policy encourages
settlements of patent litigation).
172. See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1308 (arguing that restricting patent infringement
settlement will increase the cost of patent enforcement, and discourage innovation). See
generally Eli Lilly Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 753, 784
(S.D. Ind. 2003) (concluding attorneys fees for prevailing party in patent drug
infringement case were approximately $1.5 million); Christopher Ryan Lanks, Note, In
re Seagate: Effects and Future Development of Willful Patent Infringement, 111 W.
VA. L. REV. 607, 635 (2009) (explaining prior to In re Seagate the costs of an average
patent litigation case are between one and four million).
173. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205-06 (explaining that even after litigating for
two years, Schering and Upsher took two and a half months to work through the
settlement).
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assume that Schering wanted to end the precedent litigation and continue to
remain out of court when Schering and ESI used court-supervised
mediation to handle their patent infringement claim.174 There would need
to be more deferential review than a per se illegal standard to determine an
unreasonable restraint to trade because settlements are a pro-competitive
benefit.175
iii. Congressional Review Did Not Find Reverse Payment
Agreements to Be Monopolistic or Harmful to Competition.
A per se illegal designation has also been found inappropriate when
Congress has reviewed the action and upheld it.176 Congress reviewed and
heard testimony regarding reverse payment agreements in 2003 and did not
find the practice harmful enough to amend the statute to outlaw reverse
payment agreements under the Hatch-Waxman Act.177 Instead of banning
reverse payment agreements, Congress recognized some beneficial
qualities to the practice, and left the court to continue case-by-case
review.178 Accordingly, if Congress implicitly endorses the agreement
because no harm is found, the court will give more deference to the
congressional findings and not apply a per se illegal analysis.179
2. Arguments for Applying a Per Se Illegal Standard That Are Not
Sufficient
While the reverse payment agreement in In re K-Dur may be beneficial,
a per se illegal analysis may apply if the court can determine a clear
elimination of alternatives in the market.180 In this instance and others, a
174. See id. at 207 (describing the parties argued that they felt judicial pressure to
settle).
175. See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1073 (arguing the restraint created by the
settlement cannot “extinguish competition without creating efficiency”).
176. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979)
(deferring to Congressional findings that provided positive findings for the licensing
action).
177. See Judiciary, supra note 30, at 5 (statement of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman,
Federal Trade Commission) (describing fourteen settlement agreements that had the
potential to create a bottleneck in the generic drug market); Kelly, supra note 1, at 44243 (explaining the amended Hatch-Waxman Act incorporated a provision that requires
filing of paragraph IV settlement agreements with both the FTC and DOJ).
178. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (holding the rule of reason balances the
competing objectives of antitrust and patent law that Congress was attempting to
maintain when creating the Hatch-Waxman Act).
179. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 16 (deferring to Congress’ assessment of the
economic benefit of blanket licensing in copyright law).
180. See id. at 24, n.40 (concluding there was no monopoly if alternative forms of
licensing were available).
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per se illegal analysis is not applicable because there is no clear restraint on
the market, and further inquiry is needed to determine the restraint.181

i.

Clear Lack of Alternatives: Reverse Payment Agreements That
Manipulate the 180-Day Exclusion Period May Be Held Per Se
Illegal

Under this circumstance, the only clear method of eliminating
competition is by retaining the 180-day exclusion period.182 The 180-day
exclusivity right is only given to the first generic drug company who files a
paragraph IV certification for a generic drug and is lost if the first generic
filer does not use it.183 In this instance, Upsher would be the first paragraph
IV filer and have the right to the 180-day exclusion period.184 A
subsequent paragraph IV filer who successfully invalidates the patent will
be unable to go to market unless Upsher abandons its right to the 180-day
exclusion period.185 Retaining the right would wrongly bar all alternative
generic manufacturers from entering the market and create an argument for
per se illegal analysis.186
However, in this instance, Upsher did not retain the 180-day exclusion
period, and other generic manufacturers could possibly market their drug
upon approval from the FDA.187 The Court would need to do further
inquiry on the effect of the reverse payment agreement to determine the
size of the market and whether Schering illegally eliminated the

181. See id. at 20 (concluding the license agreement did not plainly show an
unreasonable restraint).
182. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (asserting that a crucial factor in finding no antitrust claim was that the
180-day exclusion right was not retained, thus allowing other generic manufacturers to
challenge the patent in that time).
183. See id. at 1328 (explaining the 180-day exclusion period is triggered when the
first ANDA filer begins to market the drug or when a final court order finds the patent
is invalid). See generally Kelly, supra note 1, at 16 (explaining that the FDA must wait
until the 180-day exclusivity period to approve a subsequent ANDA).
184. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that
Upsher filed in August 1995 whereas ESI filed in December 1995).
185. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d at 1335
(finding anticompetitive effects when the first ANDA filer agrees not to market and not
to relinquish the 180-day exclusion period).
186. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 24 (weighing the presence of available
alternatives as a factor that can negate per se illegality).
187. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 211 (stating the Schering-Upsher agreement did
not involve bottlenecking by manipulating the 180-day exclusivity period).
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competition.188 Therefore, per se illegal analysis is not appropriate for
reverse payment agreements because all reverse payment agreements do
not clearly eliminate competition by manipulating the 180-day exclusion
period.189
ii.

Reverse Payment Agreements Are Similar to Horizontal PriceFixing, but Too Attenuated.

Reverse payment agreements should not be analogized to horizontal
price-fixing and deemed per se illegal for controlling pricing.190 The KDur reverse payment agreement ensured that Schering’s drug remained the
only one on the market, and thus would have complete control of the
price.191 Schering’s patent does not grant the right to control the price of
K-Dur but merely the right to exclude others from selling generic versions
of it.192 Although Schering eliminated two competitors from the market,
further inquiry is needed to determine whether all competitors were
eliminated so as to give Schering control of the K-Dur market price.193
Schering’s actions are not a literal example of price-fixing, and therefore
require further inquiry into the K-Dur market, which is not applicable to a
per se illegal analysis.194
iii. Historical Negative Impact on the Market Needs Further Review.
Lastly, reverse payment agreements fail to clearly establish an
unreasonable restraint to trade.195 The history of reverse payment
188. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 20 (explaining that after further review of the
blanket license, the Court found the blanket license arose out of circumstances in the
copyright market and is beneficial in that context).
189. See id. at 23 (concluding that not all agreements between competitors that
effect price are per se violations).
190. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 398-99, 400 (1948)
(holding that the patent holder’s license provision that required a minimum price for
gypsum products was price-fixing, and per se illegal).
191. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding reverse payment agreements as a horizontal agreement to fix the price because
the agreement eliminated the only competition in the market).
192. See U.S. Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 400 (explaining that patent holders can use their
patent to exclude at varying degrees, but cannot use their patents to monopolize an
industry through price control).
193. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 23-24 (holding per se illegal analysis was not
applicable because buyers had other price options).
194. See U.S. Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 400 (holding that placing a minimum price in the
licensing agreement between all the competitors was a clear example of price-fixing).
195. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344, (1982)
(explaining that a history of negative experience with the activity may warrant
classification as a per se violation).
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agreements, similar to the one in In re K-Dur, establishes that an
overwhelming number of reverse payment agreements unreasonably
restrain trade.196 Precedent shows that reverse payment agreements that
manipulate the 180-day exclusion period typically restrain trade, but these
are not found in every reverse payment agreement such as the case at
bar.197
In conclusion, reverse payment agreements that do not manipulate the
180-day exclusion period are not facial restraints to competition because
there is no clear restraint on trade.198 Without a clear restraint on trade, the
rule of reason should be used to determine whether the pro-competitive
benefits outweigh the anticompetitive effects and to determine if there are
alternatives in the market.199 Because reverse payment agreements are not
facial restraints to competition and Congress has allowed them to remain,
the per se illegal analysis for antitrust does not apply.200
C. The Scope of the Patent Standard is the Least Appropriate Analysis for
Reverse Payment Antitrust Claims Because It Preemptively Favors Reverse
Payment Agreements Without Providing a Sufficient Inquiry Under the
Sherman Act.
When the Eleventh Circuit created the scope of the patent analysis, it
incorrectly prioritized patent law concerns over the general aims of
antitrust.201 The Hatch-Waxman Act was proposed as a compromise that
196. See id. (explaining that repeatedly inquiring into the market effects of a
frequent business practice is a significant endeavor that courts attempt to reduce by
applying per se rules).
197. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (concluding that refusing to relinquish the 180-day exclusivity right
while agreeing to delay marketing may be found anticompetitive); Andrx Pharms., Inc.
v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that the 180-day
exclusion period could reasonably be viewed as an attempt to maintain a monopoly).
198. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 24 (holding that price setting of licensing fees
required further review than per se designation required); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva
Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (2003) (arguing that patent law creates an
exclusionary right and agreements with patents should be analyzed further within the
context of the exclusionary right).
199. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 217 (3d Cir. 2012) (asserting
that applying the rule of reason does not discourage settlements which are a procompetitive benefit); see also Kelly, supra note 1, at 431 (describing a reverse payment
agreement that did not allow the generic drug company to market its drug until the
patent expired, thus providing a patent monopoly extension of at least 180-days).
200. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 24 (concluding the unique factors in the
copyright industry preclude the blanket license from appearing as a facial restraint to
trade).
201. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (taking issue with the presumption of patent
validity in using the scope of the patent analysis without evaluating the other factors in
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would balance the patent rights of pioneer drug companies with the need
for generic drug competition.202 Congress wanted to allow generic
companies to file a paragraph IV certificate to legally enter the market and
challenge weak patents.203 The scope of the patent harms this balance by
asserting patent law interests over any antitrust claim.204
1. Scope of the Patent Analysis Favors Reverse Payment Agreements
Regardless of Patent Validity.
When Schering filed an infringement suit, it asserted its patent was valid,
but this is a legal conclusion that can only be legally presumed in noninfringement claims upon successful defense of the patent validity.205 In
the course of determining the scope of the patent, the Court should not
legally conclude the patent is valid.206 The validity presumption rejects the
purpose of the patent infringement case in determining whether the pioneer
drug company’s rights have been infringed.207 Considering that reports
have found generic drug companies successfully challenge patent
infringement claims in seventy-three percent of Hatch-Waxman claims, a
presumption of validity does not correspond with reality.208 Allowing
the rule of reason).
202. See id. at 217 (explaining that Congress balanced patent rights and the public
need for drugs with the Hatch-Waxman Act that the rule of reason respects). See
generally Avery, supra note 3, at 175-76 (describing the two policies of the Act as
encouraging research by pioneer drug companies, and allowing generic drug companies
to get FDA approval in a cheaper manner).
203. See 35 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2010); see also Kelly supra note 1, at 9
(stating that the Hatch-Waxman Act revised the Patent Act so that filing an ANDA
under subsection IV was a technical act of patent infringement, thus creating an early
and beneficial resolution as to patent validity).
204. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir.
2003) (citing Standard Oil Co., Ind., v. United States, 51 S. Ct. 421, 425-26 (1931))
(confining antitrust scrutiny to provisions beyond the exclusionary effect of the patent).
205. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205-06 (finding that filing a patent infringement
suit against the generic drug companies gave Schering a 30-month automatic stay
against Upsher’s ANDA approval); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530,
1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that patent validity is only a procedural device and not
substantive law); see also Ashcroft v. Paper Mate Mfg. Co., 434 F.2d 910, 914 (9th
Cir. 1970) (concluding the patent validity is a presumption that is merely an aid to
inquiry and does not automatically conclude thought and analysis).
206. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (arguing presumption that a patent holder has
the right to exclude is misguided where the underlying suit concerns patent
infringement).
207. See id. (explaining the purpose of the patent infringement case is to argue
validity of the patent).
208. See id. (finding issue with presuming a patent is valid because the presumption
asserts that the patent holder would have won the patent infringement suit). See
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reverse payment agreements through the scope of the patent analysis allows
the pioneer drug company to assert rights that it no longer has.209
Furthermore, the scope of the patent analysis circumvents patent law
because the reverse payment agreement upholds patent validity where the
court has determined none exists.210 In Valley Drug, the Eleventh Circuit
effectively overruled the district court’s holding of an invalid patent when
it applied the scope of the patent analysis.211 The district court applied
patent law in the patent infringement claim to determine that the patent was
invalid, thus denying the pioneer company’s right to exclude.212 The
settling parties agreed to uphold the patent regardless of the court’s
ruling.213 By allowing the reverse payment agreement based on its
exclusionary power, the Eleventh Circuit created a new patent right that
allowed a patent to be made valid through mutual agreement between
parties and not by patent law.214
Patent validity agreements are beyond the scope of the patent and do not
fulfill the purpose of patent law.215 Patent law was created to grant an
exclusionary right to a patent holder who met the requirements of
patentability, novelty, and non-obviousness.216 Patent litigation is costly,
but provides a competitor and the public with important information as to
who holds the right to exclude competition through a valid patent.217
Allowing parties to create a contractual patent for a weak or invalid patent
generally Kelly, supra note 1, at 16 (explaining the FTC study of drug companies that
took place between 1992 and 2000).
209. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d. at 215 (arguing a reverse settlement agreement
allows the patent holder of a weak patent to buy its way out of competition).
210. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1305 (11th Cir.
2003) (concluding the reverse payment agreement was not based on fraud because the
patent was valid at the time of the agreement).
211. See id. at 1308-11 (disregarding the lower courts holding of patent invalidity,
and applying valid patent rights to the reverse payment agreement).
212. See id. at 1305 (concluding the reverse payment agreement was a legal
agreement based on the patent rights because it was made prior to the patent being held
invalid).
213. See id. at 1300 (stating that although a provision terminated the agreement
upon patent invalidation, the settling parties did not terminate the agreement until the
FTC began investigating the arrangement).
214. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (arguing a pioneer patent holder can buy its
way out of competition and invalidation).
215. See Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892) (explaining the
public interest in not allowing worthless patents to hinder competition).
216. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (2006 & Supp. 2010).
217. See Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330 (1945)
(asserting that courts should still discuss the validity of a patent, regardless of whether
the patent infringes, because validity has the greater public importance).
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does not properly reward the inventor for her invention, but improperly
excludes others within the confines of the Hatch-Waxman Act.218 Nonparty generic companies will have to re-litigate the validity of a previously
deemed invalid patent, only to receive access to the market later.219 During
this time, the pioneer drug company has a contract creating a right to
exclude.220 This result is clearly beyond the scope of the patent because
there is no valid patent and therefore no right to exclude.221
The scope of the patent analysis should not apply to reverse payment
agreements because it improperly bases its analysis on a presumption of
patent validity and goes beyond the scope of the patent by upholding the
exclusionary effect of invalid patents.222 The scope of the patent analysis is
properly rejected because it circumvents patent law.223
2. The Scope of the Patent Analysis Is One Factor of Many That Is
Required to Sufficiently Evaluate an Antitrust Claim.
The scope of the patent analysis is not applicable to antitrust reverse
payment claims because it precludes further inquiry into the relevant
market.224 In Schering-Plough Corp., the FTC brought an antitrust claim
against the same parties as in In re K-Dur, but it came to a different
conclusion under the same facts.225 The difference was the result of the

218. See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 101 (1993)
(explaining that dismissing a judgment on a patent that was found invalid creates an
unnecessary burden on competitors to re-litigate).
219. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 204 (explaining subsequent generic companies
will be less likely to attempt to enter the market because the 180-day exclusivity period
is the main incentive for generic companies and is only given to the first one to file a
paragraph IV certification).
220. See id. at 205 (explaining that in the Schering-Upsher agreement, Upsher did
not concede the validity or infringement of Schering’s patent, but merely agreed to
delay marketing).
221. See id. at 217 (arguing the strength of the patent will be based on the patent
holder’s ability to pay off competitors, which is contrary to the policy behind the
Hatch-Waxman Act).
222. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196-97 (1963) (explaining
the patent holder has narrow limitations in patent agreements).
223. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (arguing that a patent holder is more likely to
settle to retain its patent when the patent is weak or too broad).
224. Compare id. at 212 (holding the Schering-Upsher-ESI reverse payment
agreement unreasonable under the rule of reason), with Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC,
402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding the Schering-Upsher-ESI reverse
payment agreement reasonable under the scope of the patent).
225. See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1065 (rejecting the rule of reason and per se
analysis because the court regarded the analyses as “ill suited for an antitrust analysis
of patent cases”).
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Eleventh Circuit hinging its analysis on a presumption of the patent’s
validity.226 Schering’s patent validity is a minor factor in antitrust claims
because general antitrust scrutiny does not centralize itself upon whether a
patent is valid.227 General antitrust scrutiny focuses on the contractual
agreement to monopolize and how it affects the market, not whether the
underlying legal monopoly was valid.228 Regardless of whether Schering’s
patent is strong or weak, the antitrust analysis hinges on the concerted
action between Schering, Upsher, and ESI to determine whether an
antitrust violation has occurred.229 The scope of the patent analysis fails to
review the agreement and the effect on the market, thus failing to provide
antitrust scrutiny to reverse payment agreements.230
The scope of the patent analysis is only one part of the antitrust analysis
required because it fails to evaluate important factors such as the relevant
market.231 General antitrust scrutiny requires that factors related to the
coated potassium tablet market be evaluated as a whole.232 An evaluation
of the scope of Schering’s patent monopoly is helpful in determining the
market that the court should be concerned with, but should not be the end
of the analysis.233 Understanding Schering’s patent scope allows the court
to focus on controlled release coated potassium chloride tablets and use the
circumstances to determine how that market is restrained.234 The scope of
226. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (asserting the scope of the patent analysis
relies on an unrebuttable presumption of patent validity that only favors the patent
holder and is not in accordance with antitrust analysis).
227. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum, 333 U.S. 364, 387 (1948) (concluding that
finding the patent invalid is not needed to determine antitrust liability).
228. See Katzinger Co. v. Chi. Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 401 (1947)
(concluding the contract was still illegal regardless of the validity of the patent).
229. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 189 (1963) (explaining the
antitrust issue does not involve a patent holder’s right to exclude, but rather, whether
the patent holder has the right to contractually exclude others).
230. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (concluding the rule of reason applies because
it will evaluate the actual effect on the market and not conclude the analysis based on
the settling party’s labeling).
231. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 33-34 (2006)
(explaining the analysis for patent antitrust claims evaluates the concerted effort to
exploit the patent monopoly and increase its effect on the market).
232. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)
(reprimanding the district court judge for basing his conclusion on an opinion about the
general activity of bidding for grain, without inquiring into the particular business
surrounding the activity, thus placing it into context).
233. See id. at 239 (applying a three prong test that looked at the nature of the rule,
the scope of the rule, and the effects of the rule in question).
234. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 204 (explaining that the patent covers controlledrelease potassium chloride tablets).
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the patent analysis fails to acknowledge one of the most important parts of
antitrust principles: the actual effect on the market.235
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
Although some reverse payment agreements may be found legal, as a
policy consideration, they should be banned because they undermine the
purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act.236 A major underlying purpose of the
Hatch-Waxman Act is to reduce the generic manufacturer’s cost of FDA
approval so that competition can thrive.237 Allowing reverse payment
agreements negates this purpose because the generic manufacturers are no
longer entering the market and competition is restrained.238 Reverse
payment agreements place the market at pre-Hatch-Waxman Act levels by
allowing the pioneer manufacturers to maintain their monopolies on weak
or narrow patents.239 A monopoly in the pharmaceutical market where
generic manufacturers are present, but not marketing, is contrary to the
purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act, and therefore, reverse payment
agreements should be banned.240
Reverse payment agreements also negate the ultimate purpose of the
Hatch-Waxman Act by restricting pharmaceutical drug access to the
public.241 Congress hoped to reduce pharmaceutical costs to the public by
allowing generic drug entry that would create competition.242 The increase
in competition would force competitors to lower the drug price and the

235. Compare Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005)
(concluding under the scope of the patent analysis that the payments from Schering to
Upsher were to license a different patent as stated by the settling parties), with In re KDur, 686 F.3d at 218 (concluding that under the rule of reason,the payment was for
delaying because no reasonable generic manufacturer would delay going to market
were they not paid).
236. See Hemphill, supra note 21, at 1614 (stating Congress used the Act to balance
innovation with competition).
237. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 420 (explaining that the Act resolved years of
controversy over FDA approval requirements for generic pharmaceutical
manufacturers).
238. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (explaining Congress wanted to encourage
generic manufacturers to challenge patented drugs).
239. See id. (asserting that the pioneer manufacturer is able to maintain its patent
based on the strength of its wallet).
240. See id. (calling reverse payment agreements a form of “self- help” that was not
conceived of by Congress when originally passing the Hatch-Waxman Act).
241. See id. (declaring that Congress sought to protect the public from high
pharmaceutical costs).
242. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 426 (explaining the generic industry filled more than
fifty-three percent of the 2004 prescriptions).
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public would reap the benefits.243 Allowing reverse payment agreements
maintains the status quo in the market, and the public does not receive
cheaper drugs.244 The only ones who benefit in a reverse payment
agreement are the manufacturers, while the reduced cost to the public is
lost.245
In order to reconcile the competitive purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act
with reality, Congress should ban reverse payment agreements for their
restraint on competition and the harm to the American people.246
V. CONCLUSION
When the United States Supreme Court considered the issue in a
precedent sister case, it was able to state a single clear standard of analysis
to balance the country’s antitrust law with respect to reverse payment
agreements under the Hatch-Waxman Act.247 The Court upheld the rule of
reason analysis, finding that the rule of reason is applicable to reverse
payment agreements because the legal monopolies created by patent law
and the Hatch-Waxman Act require further review of the facts.248 This
paper agrees that courts must fully examine the facts surrounding industry
factors on a case-by-case basis, while adding that if a reverse payment
agreement attempts to manipulate the 180-day exclusivity period, it is
presumptively anticompetitive.249 If such manipulation is found, the Court
243. See id. (explaining that market entry by the first generic manufacturer reduces
the price by five percent, but the second generic manufacturer to enter the market
reduces the price by fifty percent).
244. See id. (explaining consumers saved eight to ten billion dollars in 1994 when
generic manufacturers entered the market).
245. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (arguing that reverse payment agreements are
good policy for pharmaceutical manufacturers, but bad for consumers).
246. See Hemphill, supra note 21, at 1622-23 (requesting Congress provide clear
guidance to the court in reverse payment agreements).
247. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013) (holding the rule of
reason was the appropriate analysis); In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 210-14 (noting that the
D.C. Circuit has applied rule of reason, the Sixth Circuit applied per se designation,
and the Eleventh, Second, and Federal Circuits applied the scope of the patent
analysis).
248. See Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2237 (concluding the anticompetitive effect of a
reverse payment agreement depends on individual factors regarding the payment);
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979) (concluding
the rule of reason applies to license monopolies because the agreement could have
procompetitive benefits in the context of the legal monopoly created by copyright
laws).
249. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (concluding that manipulating the 180-day exclusivity period typically
results in a bottleneck on the generic market entry and is a violation of Sherman Act).
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should then apply the per se illegal analysis because experience has proven
that asserting the 180-day manipulation while refraining to market the
generic drug is an unreasonable restraint to trade.250 As a result, clear
antitrust law to antitrust claims against reverse payment agreements can be
established.251

250. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (calling for a rule of reason analysis that can
be rebutted by showing the payment was not for market delay, or that a pro-competitive
benefit stems from the agreement).
251. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196-97 (1963) (explaining
that possessing a valid patent does not make the patent holder exempt from the
Sherman Act beyond the patent’s monopoly limits, and there are strict limitations on
concerted efforts regarding a patent).
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